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Ulterior Motives: radical than the 
Understanding Castro's Intervention in Angola, 1975-1989 
Jacob Key 
MPLA, UNITA 
had the backing 
of the Western 
powers. UNI-
TA was nearly 
destroyed in the Cuba has promoted the exportation of its revolution ever since Castro declared his Marxist-Leninist beliefs in the years after Fulgencio Batista's retreat on New Years Day 
1959. Cuban specialists were spotted worldwide in the second half 
of twentieth century, spreading political dissention in Latin Ameri-
ca and overseas. The movements supported by the regime generally 
took the form of grassroots guerrilla campaigns similar to Cuba's 
own. There was, however, one notable exception: the full-scale de-
ployment of Cuban troops to the former Portuguese colony of An-
gola in 1975. This was completely unprecedented in the realm of 
Cuban foreign policy. Common explanations for Castro's interven-
tion include ideological zeal and a desire to please his Soviet back-
ers, but careful analysis of contemporary evidence suggests another 
motivation entirely. 
The country of Angola sits on the west coast of Africa, imme-
diately south of the Congo and north of Namibia. The colony was 
scheduled to pass from Portuguese to local rule in November 1975. 
However, the Portuguese government was reluctant to specify a 
specific group to empower, choosing instead to create a coalition 
government from the three major factions left over from the war for 
independence: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, 
The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, and the 
National Front for the Liberation of Angola. Soon after the found-
ing of the coalition, the Popular Movement maneuvered itself into 
total control, beginning a bloody, decades-long civil war for control 
of post-colonial Angola. 
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was 
founded in 1956, making it by far the oldest of the three factions. 
The socialist movement was based in the capital of Luanda, and 
was composed of much of that city's intellectual community. The 
Marxist ideology officially adopted by the group in 1976 gained 
much support from the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc satellites. 
Consequently, this move also brought the ire of the Soviet Union's 
enemies, leading to Western Europe's and the United States' patron-
age of UNITA and the eventual progression of the conflict into a 
Vietnam-scale proxy war in the 1980s. 
The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNI-
TA) was formed in 1966. Populist in nature, and far less 
14 
autumn of 1975, but surviving 
leaders managed to regroup and 
form a second government at 
Huambo in central Angola. The 
second government controlled 
the Ble Plateau, home to the 
capital of Huambo and much 
of the country's agriculture. 
UNITA continued to oppose the 
MPLA government despite con-
tinual defeats in both guerilla 
and conventional spheres. 
The National Front for the 
Liberation of Angola (FNLA) 
appeared in 1962 as a separat-
ist movement in the north of 
Angola. Taking a backseat to 
the larger conflict between the 
MPLA and UNITA, the FNLA 
was decisively crushed by the 
MPLA government and most of 
its leaders exiled or killed. The 
remnants of the group merged 
with UNITA in 1975 as part of 
the alternative government. 
Cuba entered the conflict 
in late 197 5 as a response to 
a South African push through 
what is now Namibia. At the 
peak of the initial conflict, Cuba 
had 36,000 troops on the ground, 
more troops, proportionate to 
the population, than the United 
States had deployed in Viet-
nam.1 Cuban troops numbered 
40,000 in 1986, and 50,000 by 
the time of the final withdraw-
al in 1989. Cuba's successes 
in those first years were many; 
South Africa was pushed back, 
Cuba became a major player in 
African politics, and the Soviets 
were appeased.2 
Scholar Jorge Dominguez 
lists four "rules" that guided 
any decision Castro or his cabi-
net made concerning the sup-
port of revolutionary move-
ments abroad. They are the rule 
of internationalism, the rule of 
precedence, the rule of bargain-
ing, and the vanguard rule. The 
rule of internationalism basi-
cally is that Cuba officially sup-
ports revolutionary movements. 
Castro gave a speech in 1966 
concerning revolutions in Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa: "For 
Cuban revolutionaries the bat-
tleground against imperialism 
encompasses the whole world."3 
Marxism-Leninism and revolu-
tion are often grouped together 
in the popular consciousness, 
but it should be noted that for 
Castro, one does not necessar-
ily demand or imply the other, 
a fact made clear by the second 
rule. 
The second rule is the rule 
of precedence, which makes 
any effort abroad secondary to 
the survival of the Cuban state. 
This means that Cuba would 
not intervene in any situation 
where the outcome would im-
pede Cuba's progress as a state. 
This rule, however practical and 
realistic it may be, still lends an 
air of opportunism to Cuba's 
foreign policy decisions, a sug-
gestion further solidified by the 
third rule. 
The rule of bargaining stat-
ed that support for revolutions 
abroad could be either cur-
tailed or accelerated as a way 
to bargain with other nations 
for "specific advantages."4 This 
rule, like the one that precedes 
it, gives priority to practicality 
rather than ideology. Indeed, 
the rules of precedence and bar-
gaining superseded the rule of 
internationalism in almost ev-
ery case.5 
The fourth and final rule is 
the vanguard rule, which states 
that Cuban support for move-
ments abroad .are contingent on 
that movement's willingness to 
defer to Cuba on ideological 
matters. This rule is perhaps 
the most interesting, and almost 
certainly the most self-serving. 
If Cuba only allows govern-
ments loyal to its ideals to come 
to power, how then does Cuba's 
foreign policy differ from that 
of the capitalist nations it so fre-
quently attacked? If these four 
rules are any indication, it can 
be argued that Cuba's motives 
abroad were more often than 
not errands of selfishness rather 
than nobility. 
Holding the intervention in 
Angola up to Dominguez's four 
rules offers a vision of Cuba's 
actions that is alternately con-
fusing and enlightening. The 
intervention fulfills the first rule 
easily. Antonio Neto's MPLA 
was a Marxist group operating 
aga in st fac tion s 
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sponsored by the United States; 
indeed, Cuba could not have 
asked for a better scenano, 
ideologically speaking. But for 
the intervention to qualify un-
der rules two and three, there 
must have been something in 
it for Castro. The most obvi-
ous answer is that Castro sought 
to impress his Soviet contacts; 
however, diplomatic relations 
between the Soviet Union and 
Cuba had been stretched quite 
thin for around a decade. "The 
Soviets may now be close to los-
ing their patience, and the Cas-
troites never had very much to 
begin with," reads a CIA memo 
dated 21 November 1967. "Bre-
zhnev thinks that Castro is some 
kind of idiot, and Castro prob-
ably isn't too fond of Brezhnev 
either."6 
Cuba had in previous years 
become very vocal about per-
ceived Soviet failures both 
at home and abroad. The Cu-
ban government criticized the 
USSR's domestic polices and 
expressed disappointment for 
its handling of Vietnam. On the 
other hand, the Soviets were 
tiring of its near-fruitless spon-
sorship of Cuba, its "socialist 
beacon" in the West.7 Indeed, 
aside from propaganda, the sup-
port and economic aid offered 
by the Soviets made little profit. 
The Soviet Union was hemor-
rhaging money keeping up with 
all of its satellite states, not just 
Cuba; Cuba however received 
some special consideration due 
to its revolutionary beginnings 
and its proximity to the United 
States. The largest aid the So-
viets offered were subsidies in 
sugar and petroleum: Soviets 
overpaid for Cuban sugar and 
undercharged for Soviet petro-
leum. Since almost all of Cuba's 
economy was based on its sugar 
plantations, the most practical 
way to keep Cuba afloat was 
to buy its sugar. The Soviets 
were paying 482 pesos per ton 
in 1975, as compared to 71 per 
less violent positions in favor 
of more patient ones, insist-
ing the revolution wait for the 
proper conditions before pow-
ering ahead. "Marxist-Leninists 
have always understood that so-
cialism cannot be transplanted 
from one country to the other 
by means of armed force," said 
Brezhnev. 10 All of these factors 
contributed to Castro's frustra-
tion with his country 's reliance 
granted the MPLA by the Soviet 
Union, as well as the planning 
of the Soviet Union's "exten-
sive" intervention into the con-
flict itself. 13 This view can be 
contradicted on multiple fronts. 
Joseph Smaldone, in the same 
book, quotes statistics from the 
United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency demon-
strating the value of arms deals 
between the Soviet Union and 
ton in 1958. By 
the same token, 
the easiest way 
to keep Cuba's 
plantations run-
nmg smoothly 
was to offer it 
All of these factors contributed 
a variety of African na-
tions. Angola from 1967 
to 1976 received $190 
million worth of weap-
ons and equipment, mak-
ing it the fourth largest 
to Castro's frustration with his 
country's reliance on Soviet aid. 
extremely low prices on petro-
leum, on average of 70 pesos 
per ton compared to worldwide 
price of 200 per ton. 8 These two 
major subsidies, as well as a 
plethora of specialists and tech-
nical advisors, cost the Soviets 
an average of $300 million per 
year during the sixties.9 The Cu-
bans were just as frustrated by 
this arrangement as the Soviets 
were; their complete reliance on 
the USSR meant that Castro's 
nation could never truly be au-
tonomous, and that Cuban pol-
icy was constrained somewhat 
by the wishes of its benefactor. 
The main area of conflict be-
tween the two Communist na-
tions was their attitudes toward 
the spread of revolution. Castro, 
of course, believed in the export 
of violent revolution from Cuba 
to the rest of the world; the 
Soviet Union instead adopted 
on Soviet aid. In 1968, a par-
ticular low point in relations 
with the Soviets, Castro gave 
a speech, exhorting his coun-
trymen to "struggle bravely, " 
and to " to minimize [Cuba's] 
dependence on everything from 
abroad . ... Let us fight for the 
greatest independence possible, 
whatever the price."1 1 
It can thus be safely assumed 
that Cuba's actions, while self-
serving, were meant in no way 
to impress or seduce the Soviet 
Union. Until recently, this has 
been the historian's prime ex-
planation for the occupation. 
The Angolan Civil War "was to 
lead to a Soviet-backed Marxist 
minority regime gaining con-
trol," wrote Ian Greig in 1977. 12 
In Soviet and Chinese Aid to Af 
rican Nations, published 1980, 
Thomas Henrikson describes 
the "lengthy and massive aid" 
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recipient of Soviet aid. 
However, this amount pales in 
comparison to Egypt or Libya, 
which received $2.3 billion and 
$1 billion in aid. The four na-
tions behind Angola- Somalia, 
Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda-
averaged $95.2 million in aid. 14 
This amounts to $19 million in 
equipment annually, roughly 
6.3% of the amount the Sovi-
ets offered the Cubans in sugar 
subsidies in the same period. 
These totals demonstrate the 
Soviets' miniscule commit-
ment to the Angolans and also 
shows by comparison the level 
of its commitment to Castro's 
Cuba, which by the same token 
demonstrates just how uncom-
fortably attached to the Soviet 
Union Cuba was. 
Nineteen million annually 
simply was not enough to spon-
sor a full-scale conflict, and 
MPLA officials were quick to 
complain of it to the Cubans. 
Agostinho Neto and Castro's 
representatives met for the first 
time in Luanda in August 1973. 
"In this conversation they also 
complained of the little amount 
of aid from the Campo Social-
ista, and if Campo Socialista 
wouldn't help them, it wouldn't 
help anyone."15 Neto told the 
Cubans that whi le arms trade 
with the Soviets had resumed 
since a lull in 1972, they were 
very small ($19 million, accord-
by Cuba. The United States be-
lieved quite the opposite, cling-
ing to intelligence proving the 
use of Soviet IL-62 transport 
planes to shuttle Cubans into 
Angola. 17 A Cuban Ministry of 
Revolutionary Armed Forces 
memo from the time shows, 
however, that those ten flights 
were chartered because the U.S. 
had pressured many govern-
ments to disallow Cuban use 
of their air facilities, and even 
more importantly, that those 
ing to Smal-
done above) 





Angola is today one of 
the world's top producers 
of petroleum ... 
aid was so paltry that the talks 
at the meeting turned towards 
further dividing the conflict into 
imperialist and socialist sides in 
the hopes of gaining increased 
assistance from the Soviets. In-
terestingly, the memo describ-
ing this meeting, from which 
these quotations are derived, 
twice calls the MPLA a progres-
sive faction. Whether or not this 
had any effect on either nation 's 
patronage can only be speculat-
ed, but it is certainly something 
to think about considering Cas-
tro's professed radicalism and 
general reluctance to sponsor 
moderate leftists. 
The Soviet Union's general 
disinterest in Angola before the 
1980s strongly suggests, con-
trary to previous scholarship, 
that the decision to invade An-
gola was one made primarily 
flights made up the entirety 
of the Soviet contribution to 
Cuba's intervention. 18 Another 
memo, written by Vice Minister 
of the Interior Pineiro Losada 
and dated 22 November, 1972, 
proves that Cuba was already 
researching the revolutionary 
movements in Angola, and had 
already received requests for 
help from the young MPLA. 
Most interesting about this doc-
ument is Losada's request for a 
survey of the locations where 
battles might be fought: "We 
suggested that we thought it 
was a good idea to send some 
of our comrades to the interior 
of Angola to learn about the 
terrain of battle and to shoot a 
film." 19 This evidence suggests 
intense interest in Angola and 
the MPLA, and also a very high 
degree of foresight. 
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It has been shown that what-
ever Castro hoped to gain from 
Angola, it was certainly not ap-
plause from the Soviets. There 
must have been something 
more, not only because of the 
four rules, but also because of 
the sheer size of the Cuban ef-
fort. While Cuba had always 
expounded the idea of violent 
revolution, it had always en-
couraged guerrilla tactics simi-
lar to those that had overthrown 
Fulgencio Batista in 1959. But 
m 1975, when open fighting 
erupted in Angola, Cuba sent 
in a full-fledged invading army. 
Cuba, suffering under econom-
ic depression, could not afford 
such an incursion based on 
brotherhood or the prospect of 
a pat on the back from Premier 
Kosygin; there must have been 
some golden incentive, some 
objective of incredible value 
that Angola could offer the Cu-
bans. 
Angola is today one of the 
world's top producers of petro-
leum, ranked 14th worldwide in 
terms of crude oil production, 
according to the United States 
Energy Information Adminis-
tration. From 1975 to 1999, oil 
production in Angola increased 
by 500%, from $ 1 billion to $5 
billion, despite the oil bust of 
the 1980s.20 Angola interesting-
ly enough is one of several oil-
producing states wherein Cuba 
tried seriously to incite a revo-
lution; Venezuela, Bolivia, and 
Zaire (Congo) are ranked 1 Ot 11 , 
57th, and 66th respectively.21 Re-
call that Cuba found the MPLA 
to be the more moderate politi-
cally of the three warring fac-
tions, odd in the context of that 
country's more common radical 
agenda. Is it then coincidence 
that the first moderate move-
ment that Castro ever supported 
after a long history to the con-
trary was the one that controlled 
the oi l fields? Northern Angola 
was home to hundreds and hun-
dreds of oil wells controlled by 
the MPLA. Indeed, much of the 
MPLA's funding came from oi l 
profits, up to 80% in the 1990s.22 
Angola certainly had the oil, but 
was the petroleum worth a war 
for Castro? 
Castro's distaste for his coun-
try's reliance on Soviet oi l has 
already been shown, and in that 
context it makes sense that he 
would take any opportunity to 
break away from Soviet hege-
mony, especially if the effort it-
self would be pleasing to Soviet 
Union, as was the case in An-
gola. Castro was obsessed with 
the war's progress, spending up 
to 14 hours a day in a war room 
in Havana and in constant con-
tact with his men on the ground 
in Angola. Friend Gabriel Gar-
cia Marquez later wrote that 
Castro's "absorption in the war 
was so intense and meticulous 
that he could quote any statistic 
relating to Angola as if it were 
Cuba itself, and he spoke of its 
towns, customs and peoples as if 
he had lived there all his life."23 
Castro had not kept up with pre-
vious projects of subversion so 
carefully; he was familiar with 
Ernesto Guevara's guerrilla ac-
tivities in the Congo only by 
way of Guevara's diaries, and 
he had shown little interest in 
Guevara's Bolivian campaign, 
which proved a spectacular fail -
ure. 
This evidence, while certain-
ly compell ing, is more circum-
stantial than it is direct. Howev-
er, as Dominguez suggests with 
his four rules, Castro was not 
one to let ideological concerns 
overshadow practicality when 
it came to foreign affairs. As 
he puts it, "Ideology explains 
the continuity in Cuban support 
for foreign revolutions; strategy 
accounts for Cuba's choices of 
movements to support."24 The 
decision to invade Angola was 
a strategically sound one; Cas-
tro could not have foreseen the 
length of the conflict, or that 
Cuba's efforts would ultimately 
not matter, as the Berlin Wall 
was to fall only about a year af-
ter the Cubans withdrew from 
Angola. What makes Castro's 
move so compelling is its very 
capital istic overtones; that very 
sort of economic exploitation 
was the sort of the thing that the 
anti-colonial MPLA despised 
in the Portuguese government 
it overthrew. The parallels be-
tween Cuba's adventure m 
Angola and the United States' 
dubious engagement m Iraq 
are staggering; in both cases, a 
more developed nation endors-
es a minority party with a simi-
lar ideology, then dispatches 
troops halfway across the world 
to keep that party in power and 
to pro- teet the oil 
fields. If the United States ' sev-
en-year invasion of Iraq is to be 
called imperialistic, so too must 
Cuba's fourteen-year interven-
tion in Angola. 
Fidel Castro is too much of 
a pragmatist for the 1975 in-
vasion of Angola to have been 
launched on purely ideologi-
cal grounds. His opportunistic 
nature and rejection of Soviet 
hegemony suggest that Angola 
offered Cuba a reward worth 
fourteen years of conflict. An 
analysis of what Angola had 
and what Cuba did not suggests 
that petroleum was Castro's 
primary goal in the interven-
tion, contrary to most scholar-
ship concerning the conflict. An 
abundance of compelling cir-
cumstantial evidence lifts this 
suggestion beyond the realms 
of suspicion into a hypothesis 
worthy of consideration. Cas-
tro's invasion may therefore be 
seen as an errand of imperial-
ism, a fact that suggests ideol-
ogy's secondary role to pragma-
tism in Castro's running of his 
revolutionary state. 
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